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Accounting Policies preceding CEO Changes in France
[Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France]

Author

Listed:
  • Yves Mard

    (CRCGM - Centre de Recherche Clermontois en Gestion et Management - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - ESC Clermont-Ferrand - École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) - Clermont-Ferrand)

  • Sylvain Marsat

    (CRCGM - Centre de Recherche Clermontois en Gestion et Management - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - ESC Clermont-Ferrand - École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) - Clermont-Ferrand)

Abstract

From a sample of 56 French firms who encountered a change of CEO during the 2000-2005 period, we analyse the nature and the factors explaining the accounting choices carried out by the outgoing top manager. The study of discretionary accruals shows that they engaged in upwards earnings management during the two years preceding their departure. Besides, the outgoing CEO who benefits from stock options is more prone to manage the result upwards. The age of the manager is also positively correlated with discretionary accruals. Conversely top manager who stays as an administrator implements less aggressive accounting choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2008. "Accounting Policies preceding CEO Changes in France [Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France]," Post-Print hal-02156579, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02156579
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02156579
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    References listed on IDEAS

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