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Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
  2. Kenneth D. Garbade & Frank M. Keane, 2017. "The Treasury Market Practices Group: creation and early initiatives," Staff Reports 822, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  3. Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
  4. Chen, An-Sing & Liaw, Gwohorng & Leung, Mark T., 2003. "Stock auction bidding behavior and information asymmetries: An empirical analysis using the discriminatory auction model framework," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 867-889, May.
  5. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
  6. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020. "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  7. Chao Chen & Zhong‐guo Zhou, 2009. "Rise and Fall of the First Financial Futures Market in China: The Case of Chinese Government Bond Futures," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 17(2), pages 110-124, March.
  8. Catherine L. Mann & Oren Klachkin, 2014. "U.S. Treasury Auction Yields Before and During Quantitative Easing: Market Factors vs.Auction Specific Factors," Working Papers 67, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
  9. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
  10. Graveline, Jeremy J. & McBrady, Matthew R., 2011. "Who makes on-the-run Treasuries special?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 620-632, October.
  11. William Quinn, 2019. "Squeezing the bears: cornering risk and limits on arbitrage during the ‘British bicycle mania’, 1896–8," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1286-1311, November.
  12. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime Zender, 2006. "Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination," Artefactual Field Experiments 00105, The Field Experiments Website.
  13. Owen Lamont, 2004. "Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms," NBER Working Papers 10659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Indranil Chakraborty & Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans, 2001. "Corners in Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 265-276, June.
  15. Tchuindjo, Leonard, 2015. "Pre-auction short positions and impacts on primary dealers’ bidding behavior in US Treasury auctions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 193-201.
  16. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime F. Zender, 2004. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 2004.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  17. Corradin, Stefano & Maddaloni, Angela, 2020. "The importance of being special: Repo markets during the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 392-429.
  18. Anderson Caputo Silva, 2003. "Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Treasury Auctions," Brazilian Review of Finance, Brazilian Society of Finance, vol. 1(1), pages 113-161.
  19. Robert Jörin & Yvan Lengwiler, 2004. "Learning from Financial Markets: Auctioning Tariff-Rate Quotas in Agricultural Trade," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(IV), pages 521-541, December.
  20. Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2016. "Pre-auction inventory and bidding behavior: Evidence from Canadian Treasury auctions," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 78-102.
  21. Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2014. "Pre-Auction Inventory and Bidding Behavior?An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Merrick, John Jr & Naik, Narayan Y. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2005. "Strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market: anatomy of a squeeze," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 171-218, July.
  23. Tālis J. Putniņš, 2012. "Market Manipulation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 952-967, December.
  24. Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade & Frank Keane, 2005. "Anomalous Bidding In Short‐Term Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(2), pages 165-176, June.
  25. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
  26. Bernardino Adão & Jorge Barros Luís, 1997. "The treasury bill market in Portugal profit margins of financial institutions," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  27. Dong Lou & Hongjun Yan & Jinfan Zhang, 2013. "Anticipated and Repeated Shocks in Liquid Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(8), pages 1891-1912.
  28. Péter Eső & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2010. "Competition for scarce resources," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 524-548, September.
  29. Owen Lamont, 2004. "Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms," NBER Working Papers 10659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Bower, John & Bunn, Derek, 2001. "Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 561-592, March.
  31. Ali Hortaçsu & Jakub Kastl & Allen Zhang, 2018. "Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 147-169, January.
  32. Preget, Raphaele & Waelbroeck, Patrick, 2005. "Treasury bill auction procedures: Empirical perspectives from French market bid functions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 1054-1072, November.
  33. Comerton-Forde, Carole & Putnins, Talis J., 2011. "Measuring closing price manipulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 135-158, April.
  34. Carole Comerton-Forde & Tālis J. Putniņš, 2014. "Stock Price Manipulation: Prevalence and Determinants," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(1), pages 23-66.
  35. Jordan, Bradford D. & Jordan, Susan D., 1996. "Salomon brothers and the May 1991 Treasury auction: Analysis of a market corner," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-40, January.
  36. Quinn, William, 2016. "Squeezing the bears: Cornering risk and limits on arbitrage during the 'British Bicycle Mania', 1896-1898," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2016-05, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
  37. Eun Jung Lee & Yu Kyung Lee & Ryumi Kim, 2024. "Profitability and herding of trade-based pump-and-dump manipulation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(20), pages 2375-2385, April.
  38. Jordan, Bradford D. & Kuipers, David R., 1997. "Negative option values are possible: The impact of Treasury bond futures on the cash U.S. Treasury market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 67-102, October.
  39. Michał Krawczyk, 2009. "Demand functions in Polish Treasury auctions," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 40(4), pages 31-49.
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