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Incentive Contracting under Limited Liability
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Cited by:
- Fabian Herweg & Daniel Muller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2010.
"Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2451-2477, December.
- Herweg, Fabian & Müller, Daniel & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2010. "Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion," Munich Reprints in Economics 19450, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2010. "Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_38, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Kragl, Jenny & Schöttner, Anja, 2011.
"Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design,"
VfS Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis
48731, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Kragl, Jenny & Schöttner, Anja, 2011. "Wage floors and optimal job design," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 01/2011, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2016.
"Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
16-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2017. "Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1954R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Doug J. Chung & Thomas Steenburgh & K. Sudhir, 2014. "Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(2), pages 165-187, March.
- Fluet, Claude, 1999.
"Régulation des risques et insolvabilité : le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 379-399, mars-juin.
- Claude Fluet, 1998. "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9802, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014.
"Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 525-550, May.
- Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2012. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-36, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Schöttner, Anja & Kragl, Jenny, 2013. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79941, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2016.
"Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," TSE Working Papers 14-475, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 462, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Zhaolin Li & Samuel N. Kirshner, 2021. "Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(9), pages 2944-2961, September.
- Leon Yang Chu & Guoming Lai, 2013. "Salesforce Contracting Under Demand Censorship," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(2), pages 320-334, May.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018.
"Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
- Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
- Wang, Xin & Tao, Zhiying & Liang, Liang & Gou, Qinglong, 2019. "An analysis of salary mechanisms in the sharing economy: The interaction between streamers and unions," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 106-124.
- Jian Chen & He Huang & Liming Liu & Hongyan Xu, 2021. "Price Delegation or Not? The Effect of Heterogeneous Sales Agents," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(5), pages 1350-1364, May.
- Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2019. "Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 852-870, September.
- Yang, Xiaolin & Gou, Qinglong & Wang, Xin & Zhang, Juzhi, 2022. "Does bonus motivate streamers to perform better? An analysis of compensation mechanisms for live streaming platforms," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2012.
"Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 753-772.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813181, HAL.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," Post-Print hal-00813181, HAL.
- Innes, Robert, 2004. "Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 29-48, March.
- Jewitt, Ian & Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2008. "Moral hazard with bounded payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 59-82, November.
- Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2016. "Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 94-98, February.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2004.
"Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
15, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2004. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007.
"Performance measurement in multi-task agencies,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 148-163, September.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies," MPRA Paper 2469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2019. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives and Plan Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2199R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2021.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2014.
"Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2019. "Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2167, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2016. "Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1954R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2014. "Games with Money and Status: How Bes to Incentivize Work," Department of Economics Working Papers 14-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2020. "Money and Status in a Meritocracy," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-09, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Choi, Kangsik, 2016. "A Note On Envy And Earnings Inequality Under Limited Liability Contracts," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 57(1), pages 91-109, June.
- Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Sonia Giannatale & Giselle Labrador-Badía, 2024. "Risk Aversion, Reservation Utility and Bargaining Power: An Evolutionary Algorithm Approximation of Incentive Contracts," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 63(2), pages 477-511, February.
- Hilmer, Michael, 2013. "Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation - a welfare analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79703, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan, 2021. "Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 374-386.
- Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014.
"Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 525-550, May.
- Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2012. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-36, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Schöttner, Anja & Kragl, Jenny, 2013. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79941, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jiajia Cong & Wen Zhou, 2021. "Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 49-71, September.
- González-Jiménez, Víctor, 2024. "Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 493-518.
- Oyer, Paul, 2000. "A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 405-426, July.
- Susumu Cato & Hiroki Nakamura, 2022. "Understanding the Function of a Social Business Ecosystem," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-12, July.
- Herweg, Fabian & Müller, Daniel, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 17/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Jessica Martin, 2020. "The Risk-Sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model," Working Papers hal-02566942, HAL.
- Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2013. "Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 468-489.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2022. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4602-4630, June.
- Jessica Martin, 2021. "The Risk-Sharing Problem Under Limited Liability Constraints in a Single-Period Model," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 854-872, June.
- Eduard Alonso-Paulí, 2007. "The Adoption of a Code of Best Practice: Incentive Implications," Working Papers 07.18, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Fluet, Claude & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Laws and norms with (un)observable actions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
- Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2013. "Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2490-2501, November.