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Detection, Identification, and Estimation of Loss Aversion: Evidence from an Auction Experiment

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Cited by:

  1. Ji Yong Lee & Rodolfo M. Nayga & Cary Deck & Andreas C. Drichoutis, 2020. "Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(5), pages 1494-1510, October.
  2. Ahrens, Steffen & Pirschel, Inske & Snower, Dennis J., 2017. "A theory of price adjustment under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 78-95.
  3. Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 1056-1074, February.
  4. Kelvin Mashisia Shikuku & Erwin Bulte & Carl Johan Lagerkvist & Nhuong Tran, 2023. "Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1060-1084, November.
  5. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017. "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Bazzani, Claudia & Nayga, Rodolfo M. Jr. & Caputo, Vincenzina & Canavari, Maurizio & Danforth, Diana M., 2016. "On the Use of the BDM Mechanism in Non-Hypothetical Choice Experiments," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235904, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  7. Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Ratan, Anmol, 2022. "Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
  8. Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2019. "Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 188-208.
  9. Canavari, Maurizio & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Lusk, Jayson L. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2018. "How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances," MPRA Paper 89715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel, 2018. "Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 176-201.
  11. A Banerji and Jeevant Rampal, 2015. "Loss Aversion And Willingness To Pay For New Products," Working papers 249, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  12. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
  13. Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022. "Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  14. Schäfers, Sebastian, 2022. "Product Lotteries and Loss Aversion," Working papers 2022/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  15. Samir Mamadehussene & Francesco Sguera, 2023. "On the Reliability of the BDM Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1166-1179, February.
  16. Kathryn Graddy & Lara Loewenstein & Jianping Mei & Mike Moses & Rachel A J Pownall, 2014. "Anchoring or Loss Aversion? Empirical Evidence from Art Auctions," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-04-2014, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Jun 2014.
  17. A. Banerji & Jeevant Rampal, 2020. "Reverse Endowment Effect for a New Product," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 786-805, May.
  18. Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Vassilopoulos, Achilleas & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2018. "Loss Aversion, Expectations and Anchoring in the BDM Mechanism," MPRA Paper 85635, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Glimcher, Paul W. & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2023. "Expected subjective value theory (ESVT): A representation of decision under risk and certainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 110-128.
  21. von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders," Discussion Papers 2019/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  22. Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Riehm, Tobias, 2019. "Procurement design with loss averse bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-060, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  23. Andreas C. Drichoutis & Stathis Klonaris & Georgia Papoutsi, 2016. "Do good things come in small packages? Willingness to pay for pomegranate wine and bottle size effects," Working Papers 2016-2, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
  24. Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2018. "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Common-Value Auctions: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk," Working Paper Series 50, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  25. Hoem Sjursen, Ingrid, 2018. "Accountability and taxation: Experimental evidence," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 24/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
  26. Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo M., 2022. "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 49-65.
  27. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  28. Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2022. "Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers," Papers 2210.10938, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
  29. Solomon Balew & Erwin Bulte & Zewdu Abro & Menale Kassie, 2023. "Incentivizing and nudging farmers to spread information: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(3), pages 994-1010, May.
  30. Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2020. "Dutch versus First-Price Auctions with Dynamic Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working Paper Series 2020/05, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  31. Kathryn Graddy & Lara Loewenstein & Jianping Mei & Mike Moses & Rachel A. J. Pownall, 2023. "Empirical evidence of anchoring and loss aversion from art auctions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 47(2), pages 279-301, June.
  32. Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2024. "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  33. Shikuku, Kelvin Mashisia & Bulte, Erwin & Lagerkvist, Carl Johan & Tran, Nhuong, 2021. "The Formation of Reference Points in Consumer Choice Behavior: Experimental Evidence from a Fish Market in Nigeria," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 314964, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  34. González-Jiménez, Víctor, 2024. "Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 493-518.
  35. Achilleas Vassilopoulos & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga, 2024. "Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 637-683, December.
  36. Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan & Bushong, Benjamin, 2022. "Learning with misattribution of reference dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  37. A. Banerji & Shyamal Chowdhury & Hugo De Groote & J. V. Meenakshi & Joyce Haleegoah & Manfred Ewool, 2018. "Eliciting Willingness†to†Pay through Multiple Experimental Procedures: Evidence from Lab†in†the†Field in Rural Ghana," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 66(2), pages 231-254, June.
  38. Park, Hyeon, 2023. "A general equilibrium model of dynamic loss aversion," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  39. Rutledge, Robert & Alladi, Vinayak & Cheung, Stephen L., 2022. "Price Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 15375, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  40. Timothy N. Cason & Charles R. Plott, 2014. "Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1235-1270.
  41. von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2021. "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  42. Uri Gneezy & Lorenz Goette & Charles Sprenger & Florian Zimmermann, 2017. "The Limits of Expectations-Based Reference Dependence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 861-876.
  43. Yuanji Wen & Stijn Masschelein & Anmol Ratan, 2022. "Loss aversion in asymmetric anti‐coordination games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1549-1573, April.
  44. Macera, Rosario, 2018. "Present or future incentives? On the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 129-144.
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