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Cited by:

  1. Jeremy Edwards & Wolfgang Eggert & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2006. "The Measurement of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 1774, CESifo.
  2. Giorgio Canarella & Mahmoud M. Nourayi, 2008. "Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 293-315.
  3. Shijun Cheng & John Evans & Nandu Nagarajan, 2008. "Board size and firm performance: the moderating effects of the market for corporate control," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 121-145, August.
  4. Felipe Balmaceda, 2009. "Mergers and CEO Power," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 454-486, September.
  5. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
  6. Marco Manacorda & Guido Tabellini & Andrea Tesei, 2022. "Mobile internet and the rise of political tribalism in Europe," CEP Discussion Papers dp1877, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  7. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Balakrishnan, Karthik & Cohen, Daniel, 2012. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-204.
  8. Martini, Jan-Thomas & Niemann, Rainer & Simons, Dirk, 2014. "Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 168, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  9. Amzaleg Yaron & Ben- Zion Uri & Rosenfeld Ahron, 2016. "Tunneling or Propping? Evidence for Related Party Transactions in Israel," International Journal of Management Sciences, Research Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 7(6), pages 332-349.
  10. Stefan Winter & Philip Michels, 2019. "The managerial power approach: Is it testable?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(3), pages 637-668, September.
  11. Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo & Singh, Ravi, 2014. "Board Independence, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb140704, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  12. Woo-Jin Chang & Rachel M. Hayes & Stephen A. Hillegeist, 2016. "Financial Distress Risk and New CEO Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 479-501, February.
  13. Cornell, Bradford, 2002. "Compensation and Recruiting: Private Universities versus Private Corporations," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt6z76z49q, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
  14. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
  15. Palmberg, Johanna, 2012. "Family Control and Executive Compensation," Ratio Working Papers 186, The Ratio Institute.
  16. Trojanowski, G., 2004. "Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance," Other publications TiSEM 5dbc874d-d1d0-44a5-9717-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  17. Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2012. "Australian evidence on CEO option grants," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 16(3-4), pages 225-260, September.
  18. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
  19. S. Belhaiza & S. Charrad & R. M’Hallah, 2018. "On the Performance of Managers and Controllers: A Polymatrix Game Approach for the Manager–Controller–Board of Directors’ Conflict," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 177(2), pages 584-602, May.
  20. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.
  21. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
  22. Daniels, Kenneth N. & Vijayakumar, Jayaraman, 2007. "Does underwriter reputation matter in the municipal bond market?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 500-519.
  23. Marco Manacorda & Guido Tabellini & Andrea Tesei, 2022. "Mobile Internet and the Rise of Communitarian Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 9955, CESifo.
  24. Michael Fung, 2013. "A trade-off between non-fundamental risk and incentives," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 29-51, July.
  25. Abudy, Menachem (Meni) & Amiram, Dan & Rozenbaum, Oded & Shust, Efrat, 2020. "Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  26. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, 2007. "Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 303-343, February.
  27. Hsin-Hui Chiu & Lars Oxelheim & Clas Wihlborg & Jianhua Zhang, 2016. "Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 136(2), pages 371-384, June.
  28. Chen, Yuyang & Wang, Xinlu & Chen, Kun, 2023. "Stock market liberalization and pay for market-based performance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  29. Jin, Li, 2002. "CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 29-63, October.
  30. Richard Heaney & Vineet Tawani & John Goodwin, 2010. "Australian CEO Remuneration," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(2), pages 109-127, June.
  31. de Meza, David & Webb, David C., 2003. "Principal agent problems under loss aversion: an application to executive stock options," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24676, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  32. Jeremy Edwards & Wolfgang Eggert & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, January.
  33. Joseph Haimberg & Stephen Portnoy, 2021. "Predicting CEO Compensation in Non-Controlled Public Corporations with the Canonical Regression Quantile Method," Papers 2101.02296, arXiv.org.
  34. Pablo Ruiz‐Verdú & Ravi Singh, 2021. "Public Thrift, Private Perks: Signaling Board Independence with Executive Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 845-891, April.
  35. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Szafarz, Ariane, 2011. "The modern corporation as a safe haven for taste-based discrimination: An agency model of hiring decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 487-497, August.
  36. Pierre-Yves Néron, 2015. "Egalitarianism and Executive Compensation: A Relational Argument," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 171-184, November.
  37. Kim, E. Han & Lu, Yao, 2011. "CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 272-292.
  38. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2005. "Board independence and CEO pay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 260-265, August.
  39. Boyle, Glenn & Roberts, Helen, 2013. "CEO presence on the compensation committee: a puzzle," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 16-26.
  40. Urzúa I., Francisco, 2009. "Too few dividends? Groups' tunneling through chair and board compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 245-256, April.
  41. Matthias Benz & Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls," IEW - Working Papers 061, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  42. Cornell, Bradford, 2004. "Compensation and recruiting: private universities versus private corporations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 37-52, January.
  43. Guoli Chen & Raveendra Chittoor & Balagopal Vissa, 2021. "Does nepotism run in the family? CEO pay and pay‐performance sensitivity in Indian family firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7), pages 1326-1343, July.
  44. Cheng, Shijun & Indjejikian, Raffi, 2009. "Managerial influence and CEO performance incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 115-126, June.
  45. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Activists versus Captured Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 4444, CESifo.
  46. Nanda, Vikram & Onal, Bunyamin, 2016. "Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-22.
  47. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2014. "Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -," CESifo Working Paper Series 4908, CESifo.
  48. Karen Moris, 2014. "The Media Influency On The Corporate Governance Practices [L'Influence Des Medias Sur Les Pratiques De Gouvernance D'Entreprise]," Post-Print hal-01899412, HAL.
  49. Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Was erklärt die steigenden Managerlöhne? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag," IEW - Working Papers 081, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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