Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game
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- Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005.
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IZA Discussion Papers
1641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundation of Trust and Social Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 5127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2005. "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 1625, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin & Zehnder, Christian, 2005. "The Behavioural Effects of Minimum Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 5115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005.
"The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
learning; product topology;JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2005-01-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-01-02 (Microeconomics)
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