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Determinants of governmental redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Gründler, Klaus
  • Köllner, Sebastian

Abstract

This paper investigates the major drivers of governmental redistribution. We retest the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis and account for a plethora of political, institutional, and cultural forces that influence the scope of redistribution. Extended and harmonized data on effective redistribution recently provided by the SWIID allows for the assessment of the origins of governmental redistribution for a broad sample of countries. Our results confirm the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, indicating that the link between market inequality and redistribution is even stronger when using perceived inequality measures. We support the decisive role of the median voter, though also approving a crucial role of top incomes. Political and institutional conditions as well as cultural aspects significantly influence governments in their decisions regarding the amount of redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Gründler, Klaus & Köllner, Sebastian, 2015. "Determinants of governmental redistribution," Discussion Paper Series 132, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewwb:132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 19746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution; Inequality; Economic Policy; Dynamic Panel Data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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