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Natural resources and non-cooperative trade policy

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  • Latina, Joelle
  • Piermartini, Roberta
  • Ruta, Michele

Abstract

When looking at the conditions of trade in natural resources the world appears upside down: Tariff protection in natural resources sectors is generally lower than for overall merchandise trade, while export restrictions are twice as likely as in other sectors. On the other hand, tariff escalation is significant in natural resources sectors, where materials in their raw state face, on average, lower duties than in their processed form. In this paper, we discuss how export taxes and tariff escalation may be the result of an uncooperative trade policy. Specifically, tariff escalation and export taxes can be beggar-thy-neighbor policies because governments may be tempted to use them to alter the relative price of exports to their advantage (terms-of-trade effect) or to expand the domestic processing industry at the expenses of foreign production (production relocation effect). In equilibrium, these policies offset each other in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation, where trade is inefficiently low.

Suggested Citation

  • Latina, Joelle & Piermartini, Roberta & Ruta, Michele, 2011. "Natural resources and non-cooperative trade policy," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-06, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wtowps:ersd201106
    DOI: 10.30875/047c5893-en
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Charlier, Christophe & Guillou, Sarah, 2014. "Distortion effects of export quota policy: an analysis of the China-Raw Materials dispute," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 320-338.
    2. Michele Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, 2012. "International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice and Policy," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 331-352, August.
    3. Solleder, Jean-Marc, 2020. "Market power and export taxes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    4. Yasushi Kawabata, 2020. "Strategic export policy towards raw materials in vertically related markets," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 239-253, February.
    5. Garred, Jason, 2018. "The persistence of trade policy in China after WTO accession," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 130-142.
    6. Jean-Marc Malambwe Kilolo, 2018. "An elementary model of export tax war," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 154(2), pages 307-325, May.
    7. Olga Solleder, 2013. "Panel Export Taxes (PET) Dataset: New Data on Export Tax Rates," IHEID Working Papers 07-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural Resources; Export Taxes; Tariff Escalation; Prisoner's Dilemma; WTO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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