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Pledge and Review Bargaining in Environmental Agreements: Kyoto vs. Paris

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  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Schopf, Mark

Abstract

This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto Protocol is Pareto superior to the Paris Agreement. Although the stable climate coalition is large in the Paris Agreement and small in the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions reductions of a single coalition country are much more pronounced in the Kyoto Protocol, so that this per-country-emissions-reduction effect outweighs the disadvantageous coalition-size effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichner, Thomas & Schopf, Mark, 2021. "Pledge and Review Bargaining in Environmental Agreements: Kyoto vs. Paris," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242450, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242450
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pledge and review; emissions; investments; stable coalition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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