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Normative Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Social Dilemmas

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  • Neitzel, Jakob
  • Sääksvuori, Lauri

Abstract

This paper shows how conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules can be used to design sequential contribution mechanisms to foster human cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Our model predicts that a sequential mechanism which solicits contributions first from wealthy actors generates greater public good provision and narrows wealth inequality more than any alternative sequential mechanism. Our experimental data show that the mechanism with rich first-movers generates greater contributions than alternative mechanisms, as predicted. Results suggest how altering the sequential order of contributions may affect public good provision and help organizations to increase the total value of solicited contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Neitzel, Jakob & Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2013. "Normative Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Social Dilemmas," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79904, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79904
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kingsley, David C., 2016. "Endowment heterogeneity and peer punishment in a public good experiment: Cooperation and normative conflict," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 49-61.
    2. Robbett, Andrea, 2016. "Sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 121-138.
    3. Jing Yu & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 685-712, October.
    4. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kingsley, David C., 2019. "Endowment heterogeneity, incomplete information & institutional choice in public good experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Banuri, Sheheryar & Danková, Katarína & Keefer, Philip, 2024. "An experimental test of gaming incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 825-850.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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