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How much do the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members affect firm performance in China?

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  • Xu, Hongmei

Abstract

This paper investigates and compares the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members in Chinese listed firms. The occupational backgrounds of independent directors and supervisory board members in listed firms are very different. Besides, different firms have different preferences in employing independent directors and supervisory board members according to their demands. Moreover, the empirical results show that characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members have no clear relationship with firm performance. No matter their professional backgrounds or age, the independent directors and supervisory board members do not have the authority to affect the decision making process of management. Thus they cannot really contribute to firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Hongmei, 2013. "How much do the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members affect firm performance in China?," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 12/2013, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:122013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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