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Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion

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  • Pusch, Toralf

Abstract

Zur makroökonomischen Interaktion von Zentralbank und Gewerkschaften hat es in den letzten Jahren vermehrt spieltheoretische Beiträge gegeben. Der Vorzug der spieltheoretischen Methode ist dabei, dass sie den Blick auf die Handlungslogiken der makroökonomischen Akteure erweitert. Zielkonflikte zwischen den Akteuren können somit deutlich herausgearbeitet werden. Mögliche Konsequenz kann beispielsweise eine deutliche Verfehlung der von den Akteuren als optimal erachteten Niveaus von Preisstabilität und Beschäftigung sein. Dass dies nicht so sein muss, wird im vorliegenden Beitrag am Beispiel einer alternativen Modellierung der gewerkschaftlichen Lohnpolitik gezeigt. Damit sind aber noch nicht die Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigungsexpansion bei stabilen Preisen erfüllt. Im keynesianischen Fall einer geldpolitischen Führung wäre vielmehr die Zentralbank gefragt, einen geldpolitischen Vertrauensvorschuss zu erbringen.

Suggested Citation

  • Pusch, Toralf, 2007. "Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion," Working Papers on Economic Governance 23, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:uhhafs:23
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy; wage policy; Stackelberg-leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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