Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?
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Other versions of this item:
- Neil Rankin, 1998. "Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 415-422.
- Rankin, Neil, 1995. "Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?," Economic Research Papers 268692, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- repec:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:527-61 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pusch, Toralf, 2007.
"Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion,"
Working Papers on Economic Governance
23, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
- Pusch, Toralf, 2007. "Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion [The struggle over distribution and monetary sanction]," MPRA Paper 15228, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2004.
"An independent central bank faced with elected governments,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 907-922, November.
- Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1999. "An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008.
"Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?,"
MPRA Paper
19719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008. "Central banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?," Working Papers on Economic Governance 31, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
- Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 1999. "Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 217-240, September.
More about this item
Keywords
Central Bank Independence ; Monetary-fiscal coordination ; demand Management;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
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