Zur Theorie des Currency Boards

Α Currency Board (CB) does not fly on its own wings. Monetary stabilization requires more than establishing a CB. Of course, the fixing of the exchange rate to an adequate anchor currency, a reserve ratio of 100 per cent for the monetary base (and by this foreign reserves) and, in avoidance of a reduced reputation, transparent rules for changes by a qualified majority in parliament only are important characteristics. Further indispensable essentials are an effective banking-supervision as well as the control of the money-creation on the base of domestic sources by means of a minimum-reserve-requirement, especially in countries under transition, or other efficient measures. This may be done by an independent central bank with additional boards, as there are a Banking Board and a Supervision- Agency, beside the CB. The foreign reserves, the independent central bank with given rules for the CB and efficient capital markets are important factors for the credibility of the CB-solution. However, most important is the social consensus. And at least, it has to be covered by fiscal stability and by (reforms of) the real-sectors and its integration into the international markets. A Currency Board is a corner stone within an efficiency- and market-oriented framework, enforcing a convergent development of the country. Interpreting a CB with its fixed rules as a suboptimal solution (compared to a more flexible discretionary policy) as well as a temporary institutionalization (or even as the lesser evil) means to reduce its credibility from the very beginning, higher capital costs and to create severe problems when (creepingly) switching to a regime with more national monetary autonomy and flexibilities. A Currency Board goes with economic reasoning and stands in contrast to politicians freedom of scope.