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Track access charges in the European Union railroad sector: A consideration of company organization and institutional quality

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  • Schöne, Andreas
  • Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp

Abstract

Track access charges are the main driver of infrastructure costs for rail operators in the rail transport sector, accounting for up to 88 percent of costs. This paper analyzes track access charges of 28 EU countries with the respective trajectories of the company forms employing panel regressions to unbalanced panel data for the period 2011 to 2019. As a result, a fundamental correlation between company forms and track access charges could be determined. Starting from a vertically integrated company, massive cost advantages could be identified for unbundled and partially privatized company forms by avoiding efficiency-impeding behavior. The results shed light on the European railroad packages and their national implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Schöne, Andreas & Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp, 2022. "Track access charges in the European Union railroad sector: A consideration of company organization and institutional quality," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 164, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Track Access Charges; Railroad Sector; Institutional Quality; Transportation; Industrial Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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