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The Puzzling Underuse of Arbitration in Post-Communism: A Law and Economics Analysis

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  • Schönfelder, Bruno

Abstract

The paper attempts to explain the failure of postcommunist traders exemplified by Balkan traders to make use of arbitration courts by means of the rational choice of forum approach offered by the law and economics movement. Conjectures about traders? behaviour derived by combining this approach with the constraints set by institutional features of Balkan countries, in particular Bulgaria and Croatia, are confronted with experience. As it turns out the successes yielded by the rational choice of forum approach are very limited. This may be a dissapointment to its most fervent advocates, but is nevertheless useful, because it suggests a more flexible approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Schönfelder, Bruno, 2005. "The Puzzling Underuse of Arbitration in Post-Communism: A Law and Economics Analysis," Freiberg Working Papers 2005/07, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tufwps:200507
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/22511/1/schoenfe_7_2005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benson, Bruce L, 1995. "An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 479-501, October.
    2. Bruno Schönfelder, 2005. "Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 61-92.
    3. Stefan Voigt (ed.), 2003. "Constitutional Political Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 2921.
    4. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-776, August.
    5. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    6. Bruce L. Benson, 2001. "Law and economics," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Schiedsspruch; Verfahrensdauer; Parteilichkeit; Berufungsverfahren; Rechtsfortbildung; arbitration awards; court congestion; favoritism; appeals process; lawmaking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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