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No information sharing in oligopoly: The case of price competition with cost uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Hornig, Stephan
  • Stadler, Manfred

Abstract

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Hornig, Stephan & Stadler, Manfred, 2000. "No information sharing in oligopoly: The case of price competition with cost uncertainty," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 194, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:194
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    2. Amir Ziv, 1993. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 455-465, Autumn.
    3. Jin, Jim Y., 2000. "A Comment on "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Vol. 71 (1996), 260-288, by Michael Raith," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 144-145, July.
    4. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    5. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Manfred Stadler & Rüdiger Wapler, 2004. "Endogenous Skilled-biased Technological Change and Matching Unemployment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, January.
    2. Koepke, Nikola & Baten, Joerg, 2005. "The biological standard of living in Europe during the last two millennia," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 61-95, April.
    3. Stadler, Manfred, 2003. "Innovation and growth: The role of labor-force qualification," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 255, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    4. Baten, Jörg & Wallusch, Jacek, 2003. "Market integration and disintegration of Poland and Gemany [Germany] in the 18th century," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 268, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Produktionskosten; Oligopol; Reaktionsverbundenheit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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