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Macroeconomic regime switches and speculative attacks

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  • Maćkowiak, Bartosz

Abstract

This paper explains a currency crisis as an outcome of a switch in how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated. The paper develops a model of an open economy in which monetary policy starts active, fiscal policy starts passive and, in a particular state of nature, monetary policy switches to passive and fiscal policy switches to active. The probability of the regime switch is endogenous and changes over time together with the state of the economy. The regime switch is preceded by a sharp increase in interest rates and causes a jump in the exchange rate. The model predicts that currency composition of public debt affects dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, the model is consistent with evidence from recent currency crises, in particular small seigniorage revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Maćkowiak, Bartosz, 2006. "Macroeconomic regime switches and speculative attacks," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-025, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2006-025
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    1. Craig Burnside & Martin Eichenbaum & Sergio Rebelo, 2001. "Prospective Deficits and the Asian Currency Crisis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1155-1197, December.
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    17. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Mackowiak, Bartosz, 2006. "Fiscal imbalances and the dynamics of currency crises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1317-1338, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ravn, Søren Hove, 2014. "Asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market: A DSGE approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 24-41.
    2. Troy Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2008. "Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2006, pages 345-391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hess Chung & Troy Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2007. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(4), pages 809-842, June.
    4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bartosz Maćkowiak, 2024. "Gambling to Preserve Price (and Fiscal) Stability," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 72(1), pages 32-57, March.
    5. Richhild Moessner, 2006. "Optimal discretionary policy in rational expectations models with regime switching," Bank of England working papers 299, Bank of England.
    6. Farshid Pourshahabi & Nazar Dahmardeh, 2015. "Economic Sanctions, Speculative Attacks and Currency Crisis," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(2), pages 340-355, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination of monetary policy and fiscal policy; policy regime switch; currency crisis; speculative attack; fiscal theory of the price level;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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