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Judicialization in international security: A theoretical concept and some preliminary evidence

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  • Mondré, Aletta
  • Zangl, Bernhard

Abstract

Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical framework to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council. In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether - and if so when - judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council.

Suggested Citation

  • Mondré, Aletta & Zangl, Bernhard, 2005. "Judicialization in international security: A theoretical concept and some preliminary evidence," TranState Working Papers 27, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1995. "The politics of legal integration in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(01), pages 171-181, December.
    2. Smith, James McCall, 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 137-180, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mondré Aletta & Neubauer Gerald & Helmedach Achim & Zangl Bernhard, 2010. "Uneven Judicialization: Comparing International Dispute Settlement in Security, Trade, and the Environment," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, August.

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