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On the existence of credit rationing and screening with loan size in competitive markets with imperfect information

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  • Kraus, Daniel

Abstract

Although credit rationing has been a stylized fact since the groundbreaking papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, hereinafter S-W) and Besanko and Thakor (1987a, hereinafter B-T), Arnold and Riley (2009) note that credit rationing is unlikely in the S-W model, and Clemenz (1993) shows that it does not exist in the B-T model. In this chapter, I explain why credit rationing, more specifically rationing of loan applicants, does exist in a competitive market with imperfect information, and occurs only for low-risk loan applicants. In cases of indivisible investment technologies, low-risk applicants are rationed. In cases of divisible investment technologies, rationing of loan size is restricted to rationing of loan applicants. In the event that the difference in the marginal return between the investment technologies is sufficiently small relative to the difference in their riskiness, rationing of loan size alone yields high opportunity costs; in addition, low-risk loan applicants are rationed in this case.

Suggested Citation

  • Kraus, Daniel, 2013. "On the existence of credit rationing and screening with loan size in competitive markets with imperfect information," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 131, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:131
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schmidt-Mohr, Udo, 1997. "Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1321-1342, July.
    2. Clemenz, Gerhard, 1993. "A Note on the Nonexistence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 727-737, August.
    3. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Information; Financial Intermediation; Credit Rationing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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