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The Desire for Land: Strategic Lending with Adverse Selection

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  • Clive Bell
  • Gerhard Clemenz

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  • Clive Bell & Gerhard Clemenz, 1994. "The Desire for Land: Strategic Lending with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 58, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_58
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    6. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
    7. Bell, Clive & Srinivasan, T N & Udry, Christopher, 1997. "Rationing, Spillover, and Interlinking in Credit Markets: The Case of Rural Punjab," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 557-585, October.
    8. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2010_022 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chien-An Wang & Chin-Oh Chang, 2008. "Is It a Heavy Log that Broke the Camel’s Back? Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 11(1), pages 38-64.
    3. Unal Seven & Semih Tumen, 2020. "Agricultural Credits And Agricultural Productivity: Cross-Country Evidence," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 65(supp01), pages 161-183, December.
    4. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2010. "Moral hazard in the credit market when the collateral value is stochastic," Research Discussion Papers 22/2010, Bank of Finland.
    5. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2010. "Moral hazard in the credit market when the collateral value is stochastic," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 22/2010, Bank of Finland.

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