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Umfassende Organisationsethik für die moderne Gesellschaft: Ein systematischer Vergleich gewinnorientierter und nicht-gewinnorientierter Unternehmen

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  • Hielscher, Stefan
  • Pies, Ingo
  • Prinz, Aloys

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag entwickelt eine umfassende Organisationsethik, mit deren Hilfe die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede von gewinnorientierten Organisationen (Forprofits) und nicht-gewinnorientierten Organisationen (Nonprofits) in einem allgemeinen Analyserahmen erfasst und verglichen werden können. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass sich die Organisationsformen nicht primär dadurch unterscheiden, dass sie prinzipiell unterschiedliche Ziele verfolgen, sondern vielmehr dadurch, dass sie prinzipiell ähnliche Ziele verfolgen, diese aber unterschiedlich priorisieren: Forprofits wollen Gewinne erwirtschaften und betreiben zu diesem Zweck Gemeinwohlförderung. Nonprofits hingegen wollen direkt das Gemeinwohl fördern und mobilisieren zu diesem Zweck als Organisation Ressourcen. Zahlreiche weitere Erkenntnisse der statischen sowie dynamischen Vergleichsanalyse unter idealen sowie nicht-idealen Funktionsbedingungen werden graphisch visualisiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Hielscher, Stefan & Pies, Ingo & Prinz, Aloys, 2015. "Umfassende Organisationsethik für die moderne Gesellschaft: Ein systematischer Vergleich gewinnorientierter und nicht-gewinnorientierter Unternehmen," Discussion Papers 2015-8, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:20158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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