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Die private Krankenversicherung in Chile: Vollversicherung oder Zusatzversicherung für ambulante Leistungen?

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  • Kifmann, Mathias

Abstract

Seit 1981 besteht in Chile ein privates Krankenversicherungssystem, dem 1995 über ein Viertel der Bevölkerung angehörte. Diese Arbeit untersucht dieses System aus ökonomischer Sicht. Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen die Anreizwirkungen staatlicher Vorschriften für die Gestaltung privater Krankenversicherungsverträge und das Verhältnis zum staatlichen Gesundheitsdienst. Die asymmetrischen Kündigungsrechte und die unbeschränkte Wechselmöglichkeit zum staatlichen System erweisen sich als zentrale Funktionsmerkmale. Es wird die These vertreten, daß das private System entgegen seiner offiziellen Zielsetzung für viele Versicherte keine Vollversicherung sondern eine Zusatzversicherung für ambulante Leistungen darstellt.

Suggested Citation

  • Kifmann, Mathias, 1997. "Die private Krankenversicherung in Chile: Vollversicherung oder Zusatzversicherung für ambulante Leistungen?," Discussion Papers, Series I 287, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ronald D. Fischer & Pablo Serra, 1997. "Análisis económico del sistema de seguros de salud en Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 17, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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    3. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
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