IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itsb12/72495.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Access regulation in the next generation access network environment: A comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore from the transaction cost economics perspectives

Author

Listed:
  • Ho, Au Man

Abstract

Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted two different models in the regulation of the next generation access (NGA) networks. In Hong Kong, the government has decided that access regulation will not be applied to fibre-based access networks and its strategy will be to rely on facilities-based competition to promote investment in the NGA networks. Singapore, on the other hand, has promoted access/services-based competition over a next generation broadband infrastructure subsidised by public funding and operated on an open accessbasis. This paper applies the theories of transaction cost economics (TCE) to analyse the two different regulatory models adopted in Hong Kong and Singapore for the NGA networks. Transaction cost economics is concerned with the study of governance structures. Governance structures operate within the relationship between transacting parties for the purpose of dealing with contractual hazards. Market, firms, regulation, public franchise and public ownership are alternative governance structures operating in the NGA environment. Governance structures aim to minimise transaction costs caused by contractual hazards.

Suggested Citation

  • Ho, Au Man, 2012. "Access regulation in the next generation access network environment: A comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore from the transaction cost economics perspectives," 19th ITS Biennial Conference, Bangkok 2012: Moving Forward with Future Technologies - Opening a Platform for All 72495, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb12:72495
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/72495/1/741504782.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cave, Martin, 0. "Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 223-237, April.
    2. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    3. Crandall Robert W. & Ingraham Allan T & Singer Hal J, 2004. "Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, June.
    4. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    5. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    6. Lundborg, Jörg & Lundborg, Martin & Lundborg, Ernst-Olav, 2006. "Infrastructure-Based Versus Service-Based : Competition In Telecommunications," MPRA Paper 3571, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-342, April.
    8. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    9. Cave, Martin, 0. "Snakes and ladders: Unbundling in a next generation world," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 80-85, February.
    10. Martin Cave & Keiko Hatta, 2009. "Transforming telecommunications technologies--policy and regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 25(3), pages 488-505, Autumn.
    11. Bauer, Johannes M., 0. "Regulation, public policy, and investment in communications infrastructure," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 65-79, February.
    12. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    13. Cave, Martin & Vogelsang, Ingo, 0. "How access pricing and entry interact," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(10-11), pages 717-727, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Coggan, Anthea & Buitelaar, Edwin & Whitten, Stuart & Bennett, Jeff, 2013. "Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 222-231.
    2. Isabel Soares & Paula Sarmento, 2012. "Unbundling in the Telecommunications and the Electricity Sectors: How Far should it Go?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 157-194.
    3. Garrouste, Pierre & Saussier, Stephane, 2005. "Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 178-199, October.
    4. Williamson, Oliver E., 2010. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 215-226.
    5. Bertschek, Irene & Briglauer, Wolfgang & Hüschelrath, Kai & Krämer, Jan & Frübing, Stefan & Kesler, Reinhold & Saam, Marianne, 2016. "Metastudie zum Fachdialog Ordnungsrahmen für die Digitale Wirtschaft: Im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi)," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 147040, March.
    6. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2009. "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," Working Papers 09-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    7. repec:ers:journl:v:xv:y:2012:i:sie:p:157-194 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yochanan Shachmurove, 2012. "Failing Institutions Are at the Core of the U.S. Financial Crisis," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Dubois, Ute, 2009. "Adaptability of competitive electricity reforms a modular analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1213-1221, April.
    10. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    11. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
    12. Dogan, Pinar & Bourreau, Marc & Manant, Matthieu, 2010. "A Critical Review of the “Ladder of Investment†Approach," Scholarly Articles 4777447, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Marc Bourreau & Pınar Doğan & Romain Lestage, 2014. "Level of access and infrastructure investment in network industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 237-260, December.
    14. Willems, Jannes J. & Busscher, Tim & Woltjer, Johan & Arts, Jos, 2018. "Co-creating value through renewing waterway networks: A transaction-cost perspective," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 26-35.
    15. Pablo T. Spiller, 2011. "Basic Economic Principles of Infrastructure Liberalization: A Transaction Cost Perspective," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Bachev, Hrabrin & Mihailova, Mihaela & Terziev, Dimitar & Georgiev, Minko & Dimova, Nadejda & Marinov, Petar & Mikova, Rosiza & Blagoeva, Snejana, 2024. "Структура И Управление На Договорните Отношения В Селското Стопанство На България [Structure and governance of contractual relations in Bulgarian agriculture]," MPRA Paper 121372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Heikki Marjosola, 2021. "The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 388-407, April.
    18. Ben said, Hayet, 2011. "Gestion publique du périmètre irrigué : Accord informel, corruption et recherche de rente [Public management of water in irrigated aera:informal agreement,corruption and rent-seeking]," MPRA Paper 34217, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Naoaki Minamihashi, 2012. "Natural Monopoly and Distorted Competition: Evidence from Unbundling Fiber-Optic Networks," Staff Working Papers 12-26, Bank of Canada.
    20. Niesten, Eva & Jolink, Albert, 2012. "Incentives, opportunism and behavioral uncertainty in electricity industries," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(7), pages 1031-1039.
    21. Juan Jung, 2019. "Mandated sharing and telecom investment in Latin America and the Caribbean," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 85-103, August.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb12:72495. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.itsworld.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.