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Zur Politik der US-Federal Energy Regulatory Commission bei der Etablierung eines Common-Carrier-Modells in der Stromübertragung

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Am 24. April 1996 veröffentlichte die Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) die endgültigen Regulierungsvorschriften nach den Bestimmungen des Energy Policy Act (EPAct) von 1992. Diese Vorschriften schaffen für den Wettbewerb im Großhandel mit Strom grundlegend neue Rahmenbedingungen. Sie schreibt den Versorgungsunternehmen vor, ihre Übertragungsnetze für Dritte zu öffnen. Dabei müssen transparente und nichtdiskriminierende Nutzungstarife erstellt werden. In diesem Beitrag werden die einzelnen Aspekte der neuen Regulierungsvorschriften diskutiert sowie einige Parallelen und Unterschiede zu den derzeitigen Reformen auf der Ebene der Europäischen Union aufgezeigt.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1996. "Zur Politik der US-Federal Energy Regulatory Commission bei der Etablierung eines Common-Carrier-Modells in der Stromübertragung," Kiel Working Papers 771, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:771
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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