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Towards a European constitution: fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences

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  • Stehn, Jürgen

Abstract

The paper analyzes one important aspect of the constitutional debate: the allocation of econornie competences between the EU and the mernber states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic competences. The main message of the theory is that a transfer of econornie competences from a lower to a higher political level always leads to a negligence of individual preferences and, therefore, can only be economically justified if national policies cause strong spillovers (externalities) to other jurisdictions. Based on this approach, the paper proposes an allocation of econornic conipetences that can serve as an overall. guideline for a European constitution.

Suggested Citation

  • Stehn, Jürgen, 2002. "Towards a European constitution: fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences," Kiel Working Papers 1125, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1125
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/2820/1/kap1125.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
    2. Henning Klodt, 2001. "Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in International Anti‐trust: Do We Need International Competition Rules?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(7), pages 877-888, July.
    3. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645, Elsevier.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Angeloni, Ignazio & Etro, Federico, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. David J. Bjornstad & James R. Kahn (ed.), 1996. "The Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 731.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2004. "The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(3-4), pages 289-328, December.
    2. Petrova, Maria, 2012. "Mass media and special interest groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 17-38.
    3. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2006. "On enhanced cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2063-2090, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; allocation of competences; European constitution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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