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Mergers and partial tacit collusion

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  • Grüb, Jens

Abstract

This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Grüb, Jens, 2019. "Mergers and partial tacit collusion," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 15-2019, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hohdps:152019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
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    5. Gore,Daniel & Lewis,Stephen & Lofaro,Andrea & Dethmers,Frances, 2015. "The Economic Assessment of Mergers under European Competition Law," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107596146, January.
    6. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco, 2016. "Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 81132, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jul 2017.
    7. repec:cte:werepe:25251 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial Collusion; Tacit Collusion; Mergers; Coordinated Effects; Non-coordinated Effects; Umbrella Effects;
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