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The Effects of Electoral Institutions in Rwanda: Why Proportional Representation Supports the Authoritarian Regime

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  • Stroh, Alexander

Abstract

While much has been written about the special design of Rwanda's judiciary in order to handle the aftermath of the genocide in 1994, other institutional actions resulting from the 2003 constitution have rarely been addressed in research. However, the second (partial) par-liamentary elections in September 2008 revealed some of the implications which the care-fully designed electoral system has for Rwanda's political development. As a starting point, the paper emphasises the need to link the debates on institutional design in divided societies with elections in authoritarian regimes. Under different regime types, 'institutional engineers' may pursue different goals. The paper concludes that in the case of Rwanda propor-tional representation (PR) has been implemented to support undemocratic goals. PR limits the local accountability of politicians in a political environment in which the government is not controlled by a democratic opposition. Thus, Rwanda's current PR system facilitates the maintenance of authoritarian power in the country, whereas small constituencies would es-tablish closer links between the local populations and their representatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Stroh, Alexander, 2009. "The Effects of Electoral Institutions in Rwanda: Why Proportional Representation Supports the Authoritarian Regime," GIGA Working Papers 105, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rafti, Marina, 2008. "A perilous path to democracy: political transition and authoritarian consolidation in Rwanda," IOB Discussion Papers 2008.03, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    2. Mozaffar, Shaheen & Scarritt, James R. & Galaich, Glen, 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 379-390, August.
    3. Stroh, Alexander, 2009. "The Power of Proximity: Strategic Decisions in African Party Politics," GIGA Working Papers 96, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    4. Stroh, Alexander, 2007. "Crafting Political Institutions in Africa. Electoral Systems and Systems of Government in Rwanda and Zambia Compared," GIGA Working Papers 43, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    5. Matthias Basedau, 2002. "Zum Zusammenhang von Wahlsystem, Parteiensystem und Demokratiestabilität in Afrika. Kritische Anmerkungen zum Potential von Electoral Engineering," Africa Spectrum, Institute of African Affairs, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 37(3), pages 311-333.
    6. Rafti, Marina, 2004. "The Rwandan political opposition in exile: a valid interlocutor vis-à-vis Kigali?," IOB Discussion Papers 2004.01, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    7. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, 2013. "Politics, political settlements and social change in post-colonial Rwanda," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-024-13, GDI, The University of Manchester.

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