Zum Zusammenhang von Wahlsystem, Parteiensystem und Demokratiestabilität in Afrika. Kritische Anmerkungen zum Potential von Electoral Engineering

According to classical theoretical assumptions plurality electoral systems produce stable two-party systems whereas proportional representation systems most likely entail considerable fragmentation in the party system and, thus, are not conducive to democratic consolidation. The article argues that these classical assumptions are insufficient both generally and in an African context. First, the variety of electoral systems is more complex than a simple dichotomy between the proportional representation and the plurality systems would suggest. Different elements of electoral systems (constituency size, electoral formulae etc.) and their respective effects (that can be mutually reinforcing or neutralizing) must be scrutinized carefully. Second, the hypothesis of strong effects of electoral systems has limited empirical support in Africa (and elsewhere): In the context of posttransitional conflicts, concentration in the party systems can be observed when proportional representation is applied (Nambia, South Africa). Conversely, when ethno-regional cleavages shape the political landscape, fragmentation is not always avoided through plurality vote (Malawi, Zambia 2001). Third, the impact of the party system on democratic consolidation is far from clear-cut and requires both an empirical and a theoretical clarification. Several other significant factors are evidently of considerable importance. Therefore, any effort of Electoral Engineering seems to be limited and uncertain in its efficacy right from the outset. Especially culturally heterogenous societies face a functional dilemma: The ends of inclusion and governmental efficiency (facilitated by party system concentration) can hardly be met simultanousely.