IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/euvwdp/323.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bankenrettung, Bankenaufsicht und Bankenunion

Author

Listed:
  • Frenkel, Michael
  • Rülke, Jan-Christoph
  • Stadtmann, Georg

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag stellen wir zwei Modelle vor, in denen die Einführung eines lender of the last resort den Geschäftsbankensektor entscheidend beeinflusst. Im ersten Fall ist die Einführung stabilisierend, im zweiten Modell hingegen destabilisierend. Die beiden Modelle eignen sich hervorragend, um die derzeitige Diskussion um eine europäische Bankenrettung und eine europäische Bankenaufsicht modelltheoretisch zu beleuchten. Zahlenbeispiele illustrieren die Herangehensweise bei der Ableitung der Modellergebnisse.

Suggested Citation

  • Frenkel, Michael & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2012. "Bankenrettung, Bankenaufsicht und Bankenunion," Discussion Papers 323, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:323
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/64551/1/72645060X.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 2001. "A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 489-517.
    5. Adalbert Winkler, 2012. "Warum kriegt Europa die Eurokrise nicht in den Griff?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 92(7), pages 449-456, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Schüler, Martin, 2002. "The threat of systemic risk in banking: evidence for Europe," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-21, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Enisse Kharroubi, 2004. "Macroeconomic Volatility and endogenous debt maturity choice," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 22, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    4. Chang, Chia-Ying, 2012. "When banking systems meet currencies," Working Paper Series 18620, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
    6. Nakatani, Ryota, 2017. "Structural vulnerability and resilience to currency crisis: Foreign currency debt versus export," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 132-143.
    7. Raddatz, Claudio & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2012. "On the international transmission of shocks: Micro-evidence from mutual fund portfolios," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 357-374.
    8. Sawada, Michiru, 2010. "Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 392-406, June.
    9. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
    10. Jiahong Gao & Robert R. Reed, 2023. "Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 387-422, May.
    11. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    12. Barra, Cristian & Zotti, Roberto, 2017. "On the relationship between bank market concentration and stability of financial institutions: Evidence from the Italian banking sector," MPRA Paper 79900, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2007. "Financial liberalization and banking crises: The role of capital inflows and lack of transparency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 32-63, January.
    14. Hernandez-Verme, Paula & Wang, Wen-Yao, 2009. "Multiple Reserve Requirements, Exchange Rates, Sudden Stops and Equilibrium Dynamics in a Small Open Economy," MPRA Paper 16748, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Aug 2009.
    15. Kim, Young-Han, 2011. "International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1914-1922, July.
    16. Chang, Chia-Ying, 2012. "Banking crises and sudden stops: What could IMF do to assist?," Working Paper Series 2063, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    17. Assaf Razin & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "Review Of Theories of Financial Crises," 2012 Meeting Papers 214, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Tabacco, Giovanni Alberto, 2013. "A new way to assess banking competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 167-169.
    19. Miller, Marcus & Li, Han Hao, 2011. "When bigger isn?t better: Bail outs and bank behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 8602, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Benmelech, Efraim & Dvir, Eyal, 2013. "Does Short-Term Debt Increase Vulnerability to Crisis? Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 485-494.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:323. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwffode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.