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Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

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  • Sawada, Michiru

Abstract

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.

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  • Sawada, Michiru, 2010. "Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 392-406, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:392-406
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    2. Khemais Zaghdoudi & Abdelaziz Hakimi, 2017. "The Determinants of Liquidity Risk: Evidence from Tunisian Banks," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(2), pages 1-5.
    3. Masami Imai & Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2022. "The effects of lender of last resort on financial intermediation during the great depression in Japan [Ginko Hatan gaoyobosu Densenkoka no Bunseki (The analyses of the effect of contagion caused by," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 26(3), pages 448-478.
    4. Chen, Ting-Hsuan & Chou, Hsiu-Hsia & Chang, Yuan & Fang, Hao, 2015. "The effect of excess lending on bank liquidity : Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 54-68.
    5. Boukhatem, Jamel & Djelassi, Mouldi, 2020. "Liquidity risk in the Saudi banking system: Is there any Islamic banking specificity?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 206-219.
    6. Karlo Kauko, 2016. "Does Opaqueness Make Equity Capital Expensive for Banks?," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, vol. 17(2), pages 203-227, February.
    7. Mosab Tabash, 2018. "An empirical investigation between liquidity and key financial ratios of Islamic banks of United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 14(3), pages 713-724, June.

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