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Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment

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  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Kirstein, Annette

Abstract

Wir nutzen die Ergebnisse eines Experiments über Lemons-Märkte, um wirtschaftspolitische Folgerungen über die EU-Verbraucherschutzregulierung von 1999 abzuleiten. Die beiden Marktdesigns, die im Experiment getestet wurden, unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Grades, zu dem die Verbraucher das Qualitätsrisiko tragen müssen. In beiden Märkten haben die Verbraucher mehr Handel getrieben als die (perfekt rationale) Marktversagenstheorie vorhersagt. Im risikoreichen, aber nicht im risikoarmen Markt erlitten Sie dabei erwartete Verluste. Diese Beobachtung kann einen Grund für ein paternalistsiches Handelsverbot liefern.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland & Kirstein, Annette, 2006. "Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200608
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juergen Noll, 2003. "Does One Size Fit All? A Note on the Harmonization of National Warranty Law as a Tool of Consumer Protection," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-231, September.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    guessing games; beauty contests; market failure; adverse selection; lemon problem; regulatory failure; paternalistic regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology

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