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Ökonomik der Kriminalität

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  • Kirstein, Roland

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag soll zunächst begründet werden, warum das ökonomische Entscheidungsmodell ganz hervorragend dazu geeignet ist, die Verhaltensfolgen von Gesetzen zu prognostizieren. Deshalb kann die ÖAR einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Gesetzesfolgenanalyse leisten. Dann wird erläutert, welchen spezifischen Beitrag die ÖAR zur Erforschung der Kriminalität leisten kann. Dieser Beitrag ist nicht auf eine ?naive? Abschreckungs- Theorie begrenzt; diese ist vielmehr lediglich ein Ausgangspunkt, der sich im Lichte differenzierter Erkenntnisse erweitern läßt. Darüber hinaus kann die ökonomische Theorie Einsichten in zwei Problemkreise vermitteln, die für Kriminalpolitik relevant sind: Dies ist zum einen die Frage, wie viele Ressourcen die Gesellschaft für die Produktion der inneren Sicherheit aufwenden soll; zum anderen läßt sich mit produktionstheoretischen Methoden argumentieren, in welchem Ausmaß diese Ressourcen für staatliche oder für private sowie für präventive oder für Verfolgungs-Maßnahmen verwandt werden sollten. Am Beispiel konsensualer Konfliktlösungsmechanismen (TOA, ?deal? im Strafprozeß) wird demonstriert, welche Einsichten sich aus der Anwendung dieses ökonomischen Instrumentariums ziehen lassen. Diese Einsichten mögen für den juristischen Kriminalpolitiker ungewöhnlich sein; dies allein mindert sicher nicht ihren Wert.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Ökonomik der Kriminalität," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200406
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Koboldt, Christian & Kirstein, Roland, 1997. "Rechtsvereinheitlichung beim "droit de suite"? Ökonomische Analyse des Richtlinienentwurfs der Europäischen Kommission," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 97-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Kirstein, Roland, 1997. "Law And Economics In Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 97-10, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    5. Roland Kirstein, "undated". "Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1082, Berkeley Electronic Press.
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