Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies
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- Alexander Muermann & Howard Kunreuther, 2008. "Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 103-123, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Externality; Mitigation; Insurance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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