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Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment

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  • Vollaard, B.A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • van Ours, J.C.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

As of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary-proof windows and doors. We provide evidence that this large-scale government intervention in the use of self-protective measures lowers crime and improves social welfare. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new-built homes from 1.1 to 0.8 percent annually, a reduction of 26 percent. The findings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes. The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We find no evidence for displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft. Even though the regulation of built-in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Vollaard, B.A. & van Ours, J.C., 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2010-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d19849d5-e661-4a83-9942-c7084ed6d526
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    victim precaution; government regulation; crime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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