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Crime In A Multi‐Jurisdictional Model With Private And Public Prevention

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  • Kangoh Lee
  • Santiago M. Pinto

Abstract

ABSTRACT Criminals move between jurisdictions in response to differences in the net returns to crime that depend on the opportunity for crime and the effort to prevent crime. An increase in police protection of a jurisdiction diverts crime to other jurisdictions when only public crime prevention such as police protection is available. However, residents also invest in private prevention (private security, burglar alarms, etc.), and the value of these measures depends on the level of local public protection. In a spatial context, an increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction not only alters the incentives of individuals of the jurisdiction, but also of other jurisdictions as well, and such a change in private crime prevention may end up attracting crime to the jurisdiction. An increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction thus may divert or attract crime. This ambiguous effect stands in contrast with the literature and may appear counterintuitive, but is logical under plausible conditions.

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  • Kangoh Lee & Santiago M. Pinto, 2009. "Crime In A Multi‐Jurisdictional Model With Private And Public Prevention," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 977-996, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:49:y:2009:i:5:p:977-996
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9787.2009.00619.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Ligthart, J.E. & Rider, M. & Wang, R., 2013. "Does the Fiscal Decentralization Promote Public Safety? Evidence from United States," Discussion Paper 2013-021, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Nichols, Mark W. & Tosun, Mehmet Serkan, 2017. "The impact of legalized casino gambling on crime," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-15.
    5. Mainali, Raju & Tosun, Mehmet Serkan & Yang, Jingjing, 2022. "Fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental transfer reform and conflict in Colombian municipalities," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    6. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam & Miceli, Thomas J., 2018. "Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 134-141.

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