IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cegedp/427.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Expected neediness and the formation of mutual support arrangements: Evidence from the Philippines

Author

Listed:
  • Lenel, Friederike

Abstract

This paper studies the role of expected neediness for the formation of mutual support arrangements between households. I predict that under strategic link formation in the context of risk-sharing, households with fewer resources and thus a higher probability to become needy have a higher incentive to engage in informal support, yet mutual support arrangements should be less likely between households that differ in their expected neediness. The predictions are tested using census support network data of a fishing village on the Philippines. I show that households are indeed more likely to form mutual support arrangements with households that face a similar probability of neediness; yet, households with fewer resources are not necessarily more likely to engage in mutual support. Furthermore, I document substantial differences in the structure of reciprocated and unreciprocated support links that need to be accounted for in the analysis of support arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Lenel, Friederike, 2021. "Expected neediness and the formation of mutual support arrangements: Evidence from the Philippines," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 427, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:427
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/240864/1/176951662X.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. De Weerdt, Joachim & Dercon, Stefan, 2006. "Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 337-356, December.
    2. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2017. "Altruism in Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 675-689, March.
    3. Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1995. "A framework for the analysis of evolving patron-client ties in agrarian economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 767-786, May.
    4. Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Are the poor less well insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 61-81, February.
    5. Laura Schechter, 2007. "Theft, Gift-Giving, and Trustworthiness: Honesty Is Its Own Reward in Rural Paraguay," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1560-1582, December.
    6. Comola, Margherita & Prina, Silvia, 2014. "Do Interventions Change the Network? A Panel Peer-Effect Model Accounting for Endogenous Network Changes," IZA Discussion Papers 8641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00825261 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2014. "Testing Unilateral and Bilateral Link Formation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(579), pages 954-976, September.
    9. Cynthia Kinnan & Robert Townsend, 2012. "Kinship and Financial Networks, Formal Financial Access, and Risk Reduction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 289-293, May.
    10. Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2013. "Informal Risk Sharing, Index Insurance, and Risk Taking in Developing Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 375-380, May.
    11. Delpierre, Matthieu & Verheyden, Bertrand & Weynants, Stéphanie, 2016. "Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor? Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 282-297.
    12. Maurizio Mazzocco & Shiv Saini, 2012. "Testing Efficient Risk Sharing with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 428-468, February.
    13. Cassidy, Rachel & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2020. "Banker my neighbour: Matching and financial intermediation in savings groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    14. Matthew O. Jackson & Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2012. "Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1857-1897, August.
    15. Gary Charness & Garance Genicot, 2009. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite‐Horizon Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 796-825, April.
    16. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1992. "Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 147-174, October.
    17. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001. "Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, And The Family: Evidence From Transfer Behavior In Low-Income Rural Areas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 389-407, August.
    18. Grimard, Franque, 1997. "Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 391-422, August.
    19. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
    20. Santos, Paulo & Barrett, Christopher B., 2011. "Persistent poverty and informal credit," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 337-347, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Will, Meike & Groeneveld, Jürgen & Lenel, Friederike & Frank, Karin & Müller, Birgit, 2023. "Determinants of Household Vulnerability in Networks with Formal Insurance and Informal Risk-Sharing," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joachim De Weerdt & Kalle Hirvonen, 2016. "Risk Sharing and Internal Migration," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 63-86.
    2. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2021. "Altruism and Risk Sharing in Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1488-1521.
    3. Attila Ambrus & Matt Elliott, 2021. "Investments in social ties, risk sharing, and inequality [“Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study”]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1624-1664.
    4. Murgai, Rinku & Winters, Paul & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Janvry, Alain de, 2002. "Localized and incomplete mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 245-274, April.
    5. Digvijay S. Negi & Christopher B. Barrett, 2024. "Consumption Smoothing, Commodity Markets, and Informal Transfers," Working Papers 116, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    6. Matthew Elliott & Arun Chandrasekhar & Attila Ambrus, 2015. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," 2015 Meeting Papers 189, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Attila Ambrus & Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Matt Elliott, 2014. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 20669, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 115-149, Mars.
    9. Garance Genicot, Georgetown University and Debraj Ray, New York University and Instituto de An´alisis Econ´omico (CSIC), 2004. "Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    10. Pierre Dubois & Bruno Jullien & Thierry Magnac, 2008. "Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 679-725, July.
    11. Gary Charness & Garance Genicot, 2009. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite‐Horizon Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 796-825, April.
    12. Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(2), pages 187-207, August.
    13. Tessa Bold & Stefan Dercon, 2009. "Contract Design in Insurance Groups," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-04, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Margherita Comola, 2010. "The network structure of mutual support links: Evidence from rural Tanzania," PSE Working Papers halshs-00585968, HAL.
    15. Jaramillo, Fernando & Kempf, Hubert & Moizeau, Fabien, 2015. "Heterogeneity and the formation of risk-sharing coalitions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 79-96.
    16. Bramoullé, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2022. "Altruism Networks, Income Inequality, and Economic Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 17000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Juan Daniel Hernandez & Fernando Jaramillo & Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau & Thomas Vendryes, 2023. "Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies," Documents de recherche 23-03, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    18. Goldstein, Markus & de Janvry, Alan & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2002. "Is a friend in need a friend indeed? Inclusion and exclusion in mutual insurance networks in southern Ghana," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6647, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Pietrobon, Davide, 2024. "The dual role of insurance in input use: Mitigating risk versus curtailing incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    20. Chakraborty, Tanika & Mirkasimov, Bakhrom & Steiner, Susan, 2015. "Transfer behavior in migrant sending communities," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 690-705.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cdgoede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.