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Money talks: Paying physicians for performance

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  • Keser, Claudia
  • Schnitzler, Cornelius

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  • Keser, Claudia & Schnitzler, Cornelius, 2013. "Money talks: Paying physicians for performance," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 173, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:173
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2010. "Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 64-91, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lagarde, Mylène & Blaauw, Duane, 2017. "Physicians’ responses to financial and social incentives: A medically framed real effort experiment," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 147-159.
    2. Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele & Spitzer, Florian & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2016. "Medical insurance and free choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 78-105.
    3. Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja & Wiesen, Daniel, 2016. "Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 17-23.
    4. Deng, Zhongqi & Jiang, Nan & Song, Shunfeng & Pang, Ruizhi, 2021. "Misallocation and price distortions: A revenue decomposition of medical service providers in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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