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Kreditfinanzierung, Kreditrationierung und Kreditsicherheiten bei beschränkter und unbeschränkter Opportunitätsmenge des Kreditnehmers

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  • Nippel, Peter

Abstract

In verschiedenen Modellwelten wird untersucht, ob und inwieweit Kreditrationierung und Risikovermeidung oder -übernahme durch Kreditgeber bei rationalem Verhalten aller Beteiligten erklärt werden kann. Ausgehend von der Erkenntnis, daß auch in einer durch Informationsasymmetrie geprägten Situation, so wie sie in der agency-theoretischen Sichtweise der Kreditfinanzierung gemeinhin modelliert wird, Kreditrationierung kein robustes Ergebnis darstellt und die Risikoübernahme durch Kreditgeber in größerem Umfang nicht auszuschließen ist, wird für eine Modifikation der Modellannahmen plädiert. Wenn der Kreditgeber (als Prinzipal) dem Kreditnehmer (als Agent) eine prinzipiell unbeschränkte Opportunitätsmenge unterstellen muß, erweist sich eine strenge Kreditrationierung, bei der planbare Ausfallrisiken vermieden werden, als einzig rationale Strategie des Kreditgebers. Außerdem werden Kreditsicherheiten im weitesten Sinne als zwingend notwendiger Bestandteil des Kreditvertrags identifiziert.

Suggested Citation

  • Nippel, Peter, 1999. "Kreditfinanzierung, Kreditrationierung und Kreditsicherheiten bei beschränkter und unbeschränkter Opportunitätsmenge des Kreditnehmers," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 519, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauman:519
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    1. Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre (Ed.), 2000. "Jahresbericht 1999," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 522, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    2. Streitferdt, Felix, 1999. "Warum beteiligen sich Banken an anderen Unternehmen?," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 513, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.

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