Should WTO dispute settlement be subsidized?
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More about this item
Keywords
Developing Countries; Dispute Settlement; GATT/WTO; Tariff Retaliation; Trade Disputes;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-INT-2007-03-24 (International Trade)
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