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Sub-National Optimal Budget Allocation and Borrowing under Soft Budget Constraint

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  • Crivelli, Ernesto

Abstract

Local governments have borrowed largely from the banking system to finance their deficits instead of responding to the rigors of bond markets. This paper analizes how sub-national governments optimally reallocate the provision of public goods and decide on borrowing, in a model where the banking system faces a soft budget constraint. In contrast with recent literature, sub-national governments allocate a higher (lower) than optimal amount of resources to consumption public goods (infrastructure investment) and overborrow if they expect the banking system to be bailed out. Controls on sub-national borrowing like the golden rule seem to be inefficient to avoid excesive indebtedness at state level.

Suggested Citation

  • Crivelli, Ernesto, 2006. "Sub-National Optimal Budget Allocation and Borrowing under Soft Budget Constraint," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 24/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:242006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal federalism; soft budget constraints; local public investment; sub-national borrowing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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