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Size and Soft Budget Constraints

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  • Ernesto Crivelli
  • Klaas Staal

Abstract

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and Soft Budget Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 1858, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1858
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    3. Jürgen Von Hagen & Massimo Bordignon & Bhajan S. Grewal & Per Peterson & Helmut Seitz & Matz Dahlberg, 2000. "Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies," Research Department Publications 3100, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    5. János Kornai, 2014. "The soft budget constraint," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 64(supplemen), pages 25-79, November.
    6. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
    7. Seitz, Helmut, 1999. "Subnational government bailouts in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 20-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    8. Eric S. Maskin, 1999. "Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 421-425, May.
    9. Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2004. "Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 149-170, January.
    10. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per & Dahlberg, Matz, 2003. "An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series 2003:28, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    11. Massimo Bordignon, 2000. "Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Relationships: The Case of Italy," Research Department Publications 3099, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    13. Inman, Robert P, 1995. "How to Have a Fiscal Crisis: Lessons from Philadelphia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 378-383, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Foremny, Dirk & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2016. "Who's coming to the rescue? Revenue-sharing slumps and implicit bailouts during the Great Recession," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-049, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Serhan Cevik, 2019. "Policy coordination in fiscal federalism: drawing lessons from the Dubai debt crisis," International Journal of Emerging Markets, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 14(5), pages 899-915, April.
    3. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    4. Karolina Kaiser, 2008. "Restricted Bailouts and the Commitment Problem in Federations," Working Papers 062, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    5. Wildasin, David E., 2007. "Pre–Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 60(3), pages 649-662, September.
    6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    7. Levaggi, Rosella, 2010. "From local to global public goods: How should externalities be represented?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1040-1042, September.
    8. Ernesto Crivelli, 2012. "Local Governments’ Fiscal Balance, Privatization, and Banking Sector Reform in Transition Countries," IMF Working Papers 2012/146, International Monetary Fund.
    9. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "United Arab Emirates: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," IMF Staff Country Reports 2011/112, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Dufrénot, G. & Frouté, P. & Schalck, C., 2010. "The French Regions’ Borrowing Behaviours. How heterogeneous are they?," Working papers 289, Banque de France.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bailouts; soft-budget constraints; jurisdictional size; public goods; spillovers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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