IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bofitp/294826.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Testing the impact of liquidation speed on leverage using Indian data

Author

Listed:
  • Banerjee, Biswajit
  • Herrala, Risto

Abstract

The paper investigates the influence of the speed of liquidation of insolvent firms on leverage. The theoretical model presented formalizes the intuitive view that an increase in liquidation speed is expected to decrease average leverage as highly leveraged firms exit. Analysis of Indian data, however, suggests that an increase in liquidation speed increases average leverage. This finding is linked to influential observations at the right tail of the leverage distribution. We propose an asset-weighted variant of the proposition that holds with empirical data.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Biswajit & Herrala, Risto, 2024. "Testing the impact of liquidation speed on leverage using Indian data," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2024, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:294826
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/294826/1/1887662995.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Srhoj, Stjepan & Kovač, Dejan & Shapiro, Jacob N. & Filer, Randall K., 2023. "The impact of delay: Evidence from formal out-of-court restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    2. Ricardo J. Caballero & Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, 2008. "Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1943-1977, December.
    3. Thapa, Chandra & Rao, Sandeep & Farag, Hisham & Koirala, Santosh, 2020. "Access to internal capital, creditor rights and corporate borrowing: Does group affiliation matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Vikrant Vig, 2013. "Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 881-928, June.
    5. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, 2022. "Weak Corporate Insolvency Rules: The Missing Driver of Zombie Lending," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 516-520, May.
    6. Dan Andrews & Filippos Petroulakis, 2017. "Breaking the Shackles: Zombie Firms, Weak Banks and Depressed Restructuring in Europe," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1433, OECD Publishing.
    7. Acharya, Viral V. & Amihud, Yakov & Litov, Lubomir, 2011. "Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 150-166, October.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    9. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Neil R. Mehrotra & Jacob A. Robbins, 2019. "A Model of Secular Stagnation: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-48, January.
    10. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Paul Krugman, 2012. "Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(3), pages 1469-1513.
    11. HARRY DeANGELO & RICHARD ROLL, 2015. "How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(1), pages 373-418, February.
    12. Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Debt Enforcement around the World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1105-1149, December.
    13. David Schoenherr & Jan Starmans, 2022. "When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor‐ or Debtor‐Friendly? Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2669-2717, October.
    14. Jacopo Ponticelli & Leonardo S. Alencar, 2016. "Court Enforcement, Bank Loans, and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1365-1413.
    15. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. "The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
    16. Dou, Winston Wei & Taylor, Lucian A. & Wang, Wei & Wang, Wenyu, 2021. "Dissecting bankruptcy frictions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 975-1000.
    17. Aysun, Uluc, 2015. "Duration of bankruptcy proceedings and monetary policy effectiveness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 295-302.
    18. repec:oup:qjecon:v:132:y:2016:i:1:p:271-316. is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Biswajit Banerjee & Risto Herrala, 2024. "Testing the impact of liquidation speed on leverage using Indian data," Working Papers 113, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Edward I. Altman & Rui Dai & Wei Wang, 2024. "Global zombie companies: measurements, determinants, and outcomes," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 55(6), pages 723-744, August.
    3. Amir Kermani & Yueran Ma, 2020. "Two Tales of Debt," NBER Working Papers 27641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Frederico A. Mourad & Rafael F. Schiozer & Toni R. E. dos Santos, 2020. "Bank Loan Forbearance: evidence from a million restructured loans," Working Papers Series 541, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    5. Nieto-Carrillo, Ernesto & Carreira, Carlos & Teixeira, Paulino, 2022. "Giving zombie firms a second chance: An assessment of the reform of the Portuguese insolvency framework," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 156-181.
    6. Favara, Giovanni & Morellec, Erwan & Schroth, Enrique & Valta, Philip, 2017. "Debt enforcement, investment, and risk taking across countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 22-41.
    7. Kose John & Mahsa S Kaviani & Lawrence Kryzanowski & Hosein Maleki, 2021. "Do Country-Level Creditor Protections Affect Firm-Level Debt Structure Concentration? [Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(6), pages 1677-1725.
    8. Bo Li & Jacopo Ponticelli, 2020. "Going Bankrupt in China," NBER Working Papers 27501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Bose, Udichibarna & Filomeni, Stefano & Mallick, Sushanta, 2021. "Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    10. David Schoenherr & Jan Starmans, 2022. "When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor‐ or Debtor‐Friendly? Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2669-2717, October.
    11. Kariya, Ankitkumar, 2021. "Borrowing from government owned banks & firm's liquidation risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    12. Rodano, Giacomo & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2016. "Bankruptcy law and bank financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 363-382.
    13. Douglas Cumming & Minjie Zhang, 2023. "Bankruptcy law and angel investors around the world," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(7), pages 1256-1277, September.
    14. Òscar Jordà & Martin Kornejew & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor, 2022. "Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the Macroeconomy," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(10), pages 4561-4586.
    15. Calomiris, Charles W. & Larrain, Mauricio & Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason, 2017. "How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 163-188.
    16. Ernest Liu & Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2022. "Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity Growth," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 193-221, January.
    17. García-Posada Gómez, Miguel & Vegas Sánchez, Raquel, 2018. "Bankruptcy reforms in the midst of the Great Recession: The Spanish experience," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 71-95.
    18. Mc Namara, Andrea & Murro, Pierluigi & O'Donohoe, Sheila, 2017. "Countries lending infrastructure and capital structure determination: The case of European SMEs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 122-138.
    19. Martin Kornejew & Chen Lian & Yueran Ma & Pablo Ottonello & Diego J. Perez, 2024. "Bankruptcy Resolution and Credit Cycles," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2024, volume 39, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Müller, Karsten, 2022. "Busy bankruptcy courts and the cost of credit," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(2), pages 824-845.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indian economy; insolvency and bankruptcy code; liquidation speed; leverage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:294826. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bofitfi.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.