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Wie ökonomisch ist der "more economic approach"? Einige kritische Anmerkungen aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht

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  • Schmidt, André

Abstract

Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, grundsätzliche Überlegungen, insbesondere aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht, über den "more economic approach" der Europäischen Kommission anzustellen. Prinzipiell ist zunächst zu fragen, was eigentlich mit dem ökonomischeren Ansatz in der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik gemeint ist. D.h., es ist nach der Zielsetzung und der Ausgestaltung des "more economic approach" zu fragen. Die Meinungen sowohl der Ökonomen als auch der Kartelljuristen über den neuen Ansatz in der Wettbewerbspolitik sind gespalten. Während einerseits in ihm die Möglichkeit gesehen wird, die bisher im Strukturdenken verhaftete "orthodoxe" Wettbewerbspolitik zugunsten einer an der ökonomischen Effizienz orientierten Wettbewerbspolitik zu überwinden, werden andererseits die Risiken einer wohlfahrtsökonomischen Instrumentalisierung der Wettbewerbspolitik betont.

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  • Schmidt, André, 2006. "Wie ökonomisch ist der "more economic approach"? Einige kritische Anmerkungen aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:0610
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