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Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy

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  • VANBERG, VIKTOR J.

Abstract

The paper approaches the ‘market versus state’ issue from the perspective of constitutional political economy, a research program that has been advanced as a principal alternative to traditional welfare economics and its perspective on the relation between market and state. Constitutional political economy looks at market and state as different kinds of social arenas in which people may realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange and cooperation. The working properties of these arenas depend on their respective constitutions, i.e. the rules of the game that define the constraints under which individuals are allowed, in either arena, to pursue their interests. It is argued that ‘improving’ markets means to adopt and to maintain an economic constitution that enhances consumer sovereignty, and that ‘improvement’ in the political arena means to adopt and to maintain constitutional rules that enhance citizen sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:1:y:2005:i:01:p:23-49_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mudambi,Ram & Navarra,Pietro & Sobbrio,Giuseppe (ed.), 2001. "Rules and Reason," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521650571, January.
    2. Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    4. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, January.
    5. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226320649 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Viktor Vanberg, 2006. "Globalisation, Democracy and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy?," Chapters, in: Kartik Roy & Jörn Sideras (ed.), Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Mudambi,Ram & Navarra,Pietro & Sobbrio,Giuseppe (ed.), 2001. "Rules and Reason," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521659598, January.
    8. Viktor Vanberg, 1999. "Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 219-243, October.
    9. Nathan Rosenberg, 1960. "Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(6), pages 557-557.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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