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Institutional framework of electronic commerce: A constitutional economic analysis of the problems with digital signatures

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  • Stamm, Hansueli

Abstract

Subject of this paper are the problems of trust in electronic commerce that have originated because of the falling apart of authenticity and identity of digital signatures. It is shown, that this problem of trust between unknown persons is one step ahead of the usual trader- or prisoner-dilemma-problem. It is possible, however, to solve it on a private basis by so called 'certification authorities'. Nevertheless, there is a lot of state regulation in the area of digital signature. The respective regulations define standards which have to be met for formal recognition of the equivalence of electronic and handwritten signatures. This is a condition for electronic commerce to be used in contracts for which the written form is required or for using digital signatures as proof in trade disputes in a state court.

Suggested Citation

  • Stamm, Hansueli, 2001. "Institutional framework of electronic commerce: A constitutional economic analysis of the problems with digital signatures," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 01/3A, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:013a
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    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Viktor Vanberg, 2006. "Globalisation, Democracy and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy?," Chapters, in: Kartik Roy & Jörn Sideras (ed.), Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Bacchetta, Marc & Low, Patrick & Mattoo, Aaditya & Schuknecht, Ludger & Wager, Hannu & Wehrens, Madelon, 1998. "Electronic commerce and the role of the WTO," WTO Special Studies, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division, volume 2, number 2.
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