A Conic Approach to the Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules
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Cited by:
- Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case," Papers 2202.06245, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
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More about this item
Keywords
Implementation; Reduced-form rules; Auction; Bilateral trade; Mechanism design; Total unimodularity.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2019-09-16 (Economic Design)
- NEP-ORE-2019-09-16 (Operations Research)
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