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Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

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  • Kim Border

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  • Kim Border, 2007. "Reduced Form Auctions Revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 167-181, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:31:y:2007:i:1:p:167-181
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0080-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Border, Kim C, 1991. "Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1175-1187, July.
    2. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2022. "Greedy Allocations and Equitable Matchings," Papers 2207.11322, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    2. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2015. "Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 1-8, April.
    4. Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case," Papers 2202.06245, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    5. Tim Roughgarden, 2018. "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures," Papers 1801.00734, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
    6. Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 415-445, June.
    7. Erya Yang, 2021. "Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 269-293, October.
    8. Sumit Joshi & Poorvi Vora, 2013. "Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 657-696, August.
    9. Byeong-hyeon Jeong, 2024. "The cost of proportional representations in electoral system design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, June.
    10. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2015. "Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 1-8, April.
    11. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2011. "Asymmetric reduced form Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 41-44, January.
    12. Saeed Alaei & Hu Fu & Nima Haghpanah & Jason Hartline & Azarakhsh Malekian, 2019. "Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 1058-1086, August.
    13. Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 335-359, August.
    14. Xu Lang, 2023. "A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Auctions," Papers 2307.04070, arXiv.org.
    15. Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
    16. Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2019. "A Conic Approach to the Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 19/12, Department of Economics, University of York.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric auction; Reduced form auction; Theorem of the alternative; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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