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Biased Mediation: Selection and Effectiveness

Author

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  • Jin Yeub Kim

    (Yonsei University)

  • Jong Jae Lee

    (The Catholic University of Korea)

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of mediator selection in conflicts that compares biased mediation and unbiased mediation. We determine when and how parties in dispute accept a biased mediator, and characterize optimal mechanisms used by biased mediators when they are selected into mediation in equilibrium. When asymmetric information is significant, parties accept biased mediation as long as the degree of mediator bias is not too high. Biased mediators care more about the payoffs of their favored party. Nevertheless, we find that biased mediators can be equally effective in promoting peace as the unbiased mediator. This implies that, once selected into mediation, the mediator’s effectiveness is independent of the degree of mediator bias. The key force of our results is that a biased mediator’s optimal recommendation strategies allocate more shares of resource to the favored party while providing a higher chance of a peaceful settlement to the disfavored party.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin Yeub Kim & Jong Jae Lee, 2024. "Biased Mediation: Selection and Effectiveness," Working papers 2024rwp-230, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:yon:wpaper:2024rwp-230
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    Keywords

    Biased Mediation; Conflict; Mechanism Design; Mediator Selection.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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