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Incentive Compatibility On The Domain Of Singlepeaked Preferences

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  • SEMIN KIM

    (Yonsei University)

Abstract

We consider incentive compatible voting rules on the domain of single-peaked preferences. In the environment where the value distributions are generic in the set of independent beliefs, we show that every incentive compatible rule satisfies the tops-only property.

Suggested Citation

  • Semin Kim, 2016. "Incentive Compatibility On The Domain Of Singlepeaked Preferences," Working papers 2016rwp-96, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:yon:wpaper:2016rwp-96
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
    2. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, March.
    3. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    4. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2011. "Tops-only domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 255-282, February.
    5. John A. Weymark, 2008. "Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, February.
    6. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive compatibility; Single-peaked preferences; Tops-only property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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